Monday, November 9, 2015

University officials agree to rip up Constitution in undercover VIDEO

The Washington Times ^ | November 8, 2015 | Valerie Richardson 


Conservatives have long accused academics of shredding the Constitution, figuratively speaking, but a Project Veritas sting operation recently caught them doing it literally.
Undercover video released last week showed administrators at Yale, Cornell, Syracuse, Vassar and Oberlin agreeing to rip up copies of the Constitution handed out off campus after an investigator posing as a student described the document as “triggering” and “oppressive.”
“Well, I think that the Constitution means things to different people; like you said it is a flawed document and the people who wrote it are certainly flawed individuals in my mind,” Cornell lead Title IX investigator Elizabeth McGrath says on the video.
Ms. McGrath agrees to rip up the hand-held copy of the Constitution and run it through a shredder after the female “student” asks, “Is there any way that maybe like we can get rid of it somehow or I can just see that like maybe it will be like therapy for me, like if you can like shred it or something?”
....
“Because in the end, you have got to laugh out loud at these videos as you listen to this chick moan and groan over the Constitution,” she said in a Friday commentary. “It the most ridiculous thing you’ve ever heard, and these officials swallow it hook, line and sinker.”
Mr. O’Keefe, who makes a cameo dressed up as a copy of the Constitution, said he was also surprised that the operation worked.
“When this idea came up in our newsroom about campus administrators shredding the Constitution because it’s a trigger against students, we didn’t think people would actually fall for it,” he told Campus Reform. “We underestimated just how stupid and politically correct these people are."
(Excerpt) Read more at washingtontimes.com ...

Why Ted Cruz is a worthy candidate for Texan of the Year

Dallas Morning News ^ | 08 November 2015 | Mark Davis 

I noticed some buzz as the Texan of the Year nominations drifted in - that as some readers suggested Ted Cruz, there were skeptical reactions along the lines of "What has he really done?"
...
Really? This calls for a broader canvass of conservatives, so I'll start.
Not all Texans need to agree with Cruz - shoot, not even all conservatives agree with him, and some Republicans hate his guts. But that's my point. Cruz has become the definition of the kind of bold conservatism that is energizing some and terrifying others.
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If we are known by our enemies, in Cruz's case,...and Republicans who got away with calling themselves conservative until Cruz raised the bar.
He has raised it in his three-year Senate career and in his seven-month presidential campaign by holding feet over the fire - the feet of Democrats who have helped Barack Obama change America's fabric (and not for the better), and the feet of Republicans who promised to do something about it and scarcely tried.
That strain of Republicans, exemplified by extinct House Speaker John Boehner, his failed, hand-picked successor Kevin McCarthy, and their lukewarm Senate counterpart Mitch McConnell, has been outed most notably by Cruz, who has properly shamed them for consistently caving on core conservative values. That has earned him scorn on Capitol Hill, and the profound devotion of millions of conservatives who say it's about time.
...
...but there is a reason he would be Hillary Clinton's worst nightmare on a debate stage. His focus and passion on the emerging favored themes of consistent and unapologetic conservatism are without peer, inside Texas or outside.
The political story of the year is a Republican Party being reshaped by stronger conservative voices, and voters yearning for elected officials no longer satisfied with insufficient efforts to re-establish those values.
Cruz is the foremost example of both.
(Excerpt) Read more at dallasnews.com ...

Why Obama’s Keystone XL rejection excuses are a complete load of crap!

Canada Free Press ^ | 11/09/15 | Herman Cain 

From one who specializes in it.
It’s bad enough that President Obama dragged his feet for seven years before doing what everyone knew he was going to do. TransCanada, the Canadian government an awful lot of Americans who could have used the economic boost (including the folks in North Dakota and an awful lot of Obama’s union supporters) were left to twist in the wind while Obama pretended he was “reviewing” the proposed Keystone XL pipeline.
Of course, he was doing no such thing. He knew on Day 1 he was going to reject it because that’s what his extreme environnmentalist supporters demanded - and it’s also what he personally believes in because he’s one of those extreme environmentalists. He hates the oil industry and will never do anything to promote its success if he can help it. (Even his bragging about increased domestic oil production is nonsense because that’s all happening on private lands. Obama stops it from happening on federal lands every chance he gets.)

Where Was the Media’s Interest in Obama’s Relation to Rev. Wright, Frank Davis, Ayers?

The National Review ^ | November 8, 2015 | John Fund 

It's been less than two weeks since CNBC's train wreck of a debate exposed just how much of a double standard the mainstream media can have against GOP presidential candidates.
Now a new example comes in the attack on Ben Carson for saying in his autobiography that he was offered a full scholarship to West Point. In a news conference on Friday, Carson said the offer from Army officials was informal and he never in fact applied to the military academy, which is how he described it in his book Gifted Hands, first published in 1990:
I was offered a full scholarship to West Point. I didn't refuse the scholarship outright, but I let them know a military career wasn't where I saw myself going. . . . As overjoyed as I felt to be offered such a scholarship, I wasn't really tempted. . . . I wanted to be a doctor. . . . Each college required a ten-dollar non-returnable entrance fee sent with the application. I had exactly ten, so I could apply to only one.
Carson has also been questioned by CNN about why several people who knew him growing up don't recall that he had exhibited anger or violence. Carson noted that most of the people the media has talked to knew him in high school, and that his last "violent episode" occurred in the ninth grade, before he had a religious conversion. Carson said that he did try to stab someone, "a relative who does not want to be subjected to the media."
But Carson's news conference was most memorable for his willingness to push back against the media:
I do not remember this level of scrutiny for one President Barack Obama when he was running. In fact I remember just the opposite. I remember people saying, 'Oh, we won't really talk about that. We won't talk about that relationship. Well, Frank Marshall Davis, well, we don't want to talk about that. Bernardine Dohrn, Bill Ayers, well he don't really know him. All the things that Jeremiah Wright was saying, oh, not a big problem.
A reporter responded to Carson's complaint that there was a "desperation on behalf of some" to find some kind of scandal surrounding him by saying, "Our job is to ask questions." Carson paused and said: "There is a fair way to do this and a very unfair way to do this. . . . My job is to call you out when you are unfair." At another point he said: "You are not going to find with me, somebody who will sit back and let you be completely unfair without letting the American people know what is going on. The American people are waking up to these games."
Carson's comments about the media, and his complaints about Barack Obama, were - no surprise - barely reported. But they deserve an airing.
By those standards, Barack Obama was clearly the beneficiary of enormous media forbearance while he ran for president.
When Bob Schieffer retired as host of CBS's Face the Nation last June, he admitted to Howard Kurtz of Fox News: "Maybe we were not skeptical enough. It was a campaign." He added that in his view it is the role of the opponents to "make the campaign" question the records of candidates. I wouldn't want to tell that to Woodward and Bernstein about their coverage of Watergate during the 1972 election.
Just before the 2008 election, Mark Halperin, co-author of the best-selling campaign book Game Change and now a Bloomberg TV host, was asked at a conference if the media had been too soft on Obama. He answered yes and went on to say that through the subtle choice of which stories to cover and where to deploy investigative resources, the national media had handed Obama "hundreds of millions in free publicity."
As I described in 2011:
Halperin attributed the positive coverage in part to the historic nature of Obama's candidacy. But he also noted that only a few hands had gone up in the crowded room when the audience had been asked how many had voted for George W. Bush. "I find it curious that far more time and media energy has been spent on Sarah Palin's time in Wasilla, Alaska's, city government in the last eight weeks than in looking at Barack Obama's dozen years in Chicago politics and government over the last 18 months of his candidacy," he noted dryly. And Ms. Palin was only running for vice president. . . . He called on reporters to look at their 2008 coverage of candidates after the election, in hopes that in the future they will "do a better job treating people equally."
As Ben Carson might say: fat chance of that happening.
It's worth revisiting just how much the media gave Obama a pass in 2008. Take the infamous videos of the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, Obama's Chicago pastor. Brian Ross's ABC News report on Wright didn't air until March 13, 2008, after more than 40 states had voted in the Democratic nomination contest and Obama needed only 225 delegates to wrap up the race against Hillary Clinton. Ironically, the videos of Wright's speeches had been hiding in plain sight, easily obtainable in the gift store of Wright's church. "After the videos hit, Obama narrowly limped home to the nomination as Hillary outperformed him badly, 302 to 171 in delegates in the final three months," noted media critic Dan Curry earlier this year on his blog, Reverse Spin. If the Wright videos had hit prior to the Iowa caucuses, he says they "would undoubtedly have been devastating and fatal to a largely undefined Barack Obama."
Ironically, the Wright videos had in fact emerged earlier, in February 2007, when Rolling Stone ran a piece called "The Radical Roots of Barack Obama" right before Obama announced his bid for the presidency. The story so rattled the Obama team that they pulled Wright from the speaking roster less than 24 hours before the campaign announcement. But as former CBS News reporter Bernie Goldberg noted, the follow-up coverage on the Wright story was scant and notably apologetic. The story should have prompted full explorations of the Obama-Wright connections. Instead, there was media malpractice.
The media malpractice extended to many other areas of Obama's life.
In October 2007, the New York Times ran an article headlined 'Obama's Account of New York Years Often Differs from What Others Say." It reported that Obama resisted any attempts to reconcile his account in his 1995 memoir Dreams from My Father with the recollections and records of those who knew him. The Times reported:
Yet he declined repeated requests to talk about his New York years, release his Columbia transcript, or identify even a single fellow student, co-worker, roommate, or friend from those years.
A campaign spokesman, Ben LaBolt, had this explanation for the candidate's silence: "He doesn't remember the names of a lot of people in his life."
Obama was also not willing to part with many of the names of people he knew and did remember, even those of whom he would have had records. His campaign declined to release a list of the approximately 30 clients for whom he worked personally while he was a lawyer with a law firm with close ties to the Daley machine in Chicago. His campaign also concealed and obfuscated relevant facts about Obama's ties to the radical group ACORN - in the 1990s, he had served as a top trainer and lawyer for ACORN.
Jack Cashill, the author of Deconstructing Obama, noted this weekend that Carson was right to point out the media's lack of interest in Frank Marshall Davis, a well-known Communist who was Obama's mentor in Hawaii. Davis wasn't someone whose membership in the Communist party was a youthful indiscretion. He was a member of the party during the Stalin era until he was well into his 40s, and in 1956, Davis even took the Fifth Amendment in front of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.
Obama spent 2,500 words in Dreams from My Father describing Davis's influence on his life, but, before the 2008 election, no mainstream media outlet examined the connection.
But Obama was clearly worried that Marshall's past might haunt Obama in the run-up to this presidential campaign. His publisher said he "personally approved" the audio version of his memoir when it was released in 2005. That version removed all 22 of the book's references to his mentor "Frank."
In 2012, David Maraniss of the Washington Post published a biography of Obama that belatedly discussed Davis as well as the many discrepancies in Obama's account of his life. In his review of the Maraniss book, Buzzfeed's Ben Smith wrote, "I counted 38 instances in which the biographer convincingly disputes significant elements of Obama's own story of his life and his family history." But reporters investigated very few of those discrepancies before the 2008 election.
No one is suggesting that Ben Carson be given a pass on statements he made in his autobiography. Those are fair game. Carson has also at times unfairly lashed out at reporters - he criticized NRO's Jim Geraghty for investigating Carson's speeches and appearance for Mannatech. We should call out Carson for these unfair assaults.
But let's stop pretending that there isn't a glaring double standard in how presidential candidates are treated if they depart from the mainstream media's ideological premises.
As Ben Carson put it in his news conference last Friday: "There is a fair way to do this and a very unfair way to do this."

Can the US Army win the next war?

US Defense Watch ^ | November 9, 2015 | Morris Schaffer 

Word is starting to seep out, like water slowly exiting a crack in a dam that the US Army’s armored warfare capabilities, capacity and readiness are in big trouble.
Coming out of nearly a dozen years of infantry combat in the Middle East against insurgent forces, the Army is still heavily focused on infantry tactics operations, peacekeeping and special warfare.
The knowledge and skills needed to fight traditional US Army battles, with armor and mechanized infantry backed up by superior air support, in what used to be called Air Land Battle seem about as ancient as the Dead Sea Scrolls.
But, now, the Pentagon is starting to worry that the next fight might be against Russian forces in the Baltic or a conflict with the Iranians, backed up by an umbrella of high tech, Russian-made air defense systems and surface to surface missiles.
Where would the US Army stand in a slug fest against the Russian Army or the Iranians? To have an accurate answer, several tenets have to be examined: current tactical competence, capabilities, capacity, readiness and doctrine.
TACTICAL COMPETENCE
Retired US Army armor officer, Colonel Gian Gentile, recently wrote an eye opening article in Armor Magazine, titled “Death of the Armor Corps,” which discusses the current tactical competence of officers and troopers from Armor branch. The article is shocking to say the least and quite frightening.
According to Gentile, “I have also heard reports from the field that the operational army has Armor (19K) Non Commissioned Officers as high as the rank of Staff Sergeant who have never qualified on a M1 Tank. When was the last time that a heavy Brigade Combat Team has done a combined arms, live fire exercise integrating all arms at Brigade level? Do the Armor, Artillery, and Infantry Branches even have the collective knowledge to know how to do one anymore? My own experience as a cavalry squadron commander returning from a combat deployment in Baghdad a few years ago mirrors these kinds of stories where I had lieutenants who had never qualified on a Bradley and a squadron that didn’t know collectively anymore how to run a Bradley gunnery range.”
Compare this lack of knowledge to the US Army of the late 1980’s, where, if needed, two privates from a cavalry squadron staff section could successfully run a gunnery range until it was handed off to NCO’s and officers.
Gentile was asked if a current US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team or BCT could conduct a movement to contact against an enemy armored force. “Could we do it? It would be hard to do such an operation without the intellectual framework of an Armored Force that the American Army used to have, but of late has gone away. It will be hard, very hard to get it back. Competent field armies, skilled in all-arms warfare, are not made overnight.”
CAPABILITIES, CAPACITY AND READINESS
According to the Heritage Group’s 2016 Assessment of US Military Strength:
“BCTs are the basic “building blocks” for employment of Army combat forces. They are normally employed within a larger framework of U.S. land operations but are sufficiently equipped and organized so that they can conduct independent operations as circumstances demand.11 A BCT averages 4,500 soldiers in strength depending on its variant: Stryker, Armored, or Infantry. A Stryker BCT is a mechanized infantry force organized around the Stryker ground combat vehicle (GCV). Armored BCTs are the Army’s principal armored unit and employ the Abrams main battle tank and the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle. An Infantry BCT is a highly maneuverable motorized unit.”
“While end strength is a valuable metric in understanding Army capacity, counting BCTs is a more telling measure of actual hard-power capacity. In concert with the end strength reduction to 490,000 soldiers, the Active Army underwent brigade restructuring that decreased the number of BCTs from 38 to 32 by the end of FY 2015.15 As a part of this reorganization, the Army is also adding a third maneuver battalion to its infantry and armored BCTs by the end of FY 2015.16″
“The reduction in end strength in the past year has had a disproportionate effect on BCTs. To illustrate, the Active Army has been downsized from 45 BCTs (552,100 soldiers) in FY 2013 to 32 BCTs (490,000 soldiers) in FY 2015. Thus, a 12 percent reduction in troop numbers resulted in a 29 percent reduction in BCTs. The Army Chief of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2015 that the Army can meet the missions outlined in the 2012 DSG with this current force size, but he also warned that the continuation of sequestration would prevent the Army from executing the DSG.20″
“Overall, the Army’s equipment inventory is relatively healthy. While some equipment has been worn down by usage in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has undertaken a “reset” initiative that is discussed below in the readiness section. The bulk of Army vehicles are young because of recent remanufacture programs for the Abrams and Bradley that have extended the service life of both vehicles. For example, the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank has recently been completely upgraded and is now only 5.5 years old.21 The Army also maintains an inventory of battlefield-tested and reliable rotorcraft, including its UH-60 Black Hawks, AH-64 Apaches, and CH-47 Chinooks.”
DOCTRINE
While the Army’s Armor Branch is suffering from basic skill set problems among its soldiers and the larger problems addressed by the Heritage Group’s study, an academic battle is raging in the Pentagon concerning the continued use of the BCT vs. the so-called RSG (Reconnaissance Strike Group).
Leading the charge for the implementation of the RSG, is retired US Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor, who participated in the Battle of 73 Easting, while serving as the operations officer for Cougar Squadron, in the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment.
Several years ago, Macgregor, published a book called Breaking The Phalanx, recommending that his service “restructure itself into modularly organized, highly mobile, self-contained combined arms teams.”
Macgregor circulated a PowerPoint presentation showing that in a head-to-head confrontation pitting the equivalent of a U.S. armored division against a likely Russian adversary, the U.S. division would be annihilated. The 21-slide presentation features four battle scenarios, all of them against a Russian adversary in the Baltics – what one currently serving war planner on the Joint Chiefs staff calls “the most likely warfighting scenario we will face outside of the Middle East.”
In two of the scenarios, where the U.S. deploys its current basic formation, called brigade combat teams (BCTs), the U.S. is defeated. In two other scenarios, where Macgregor deploys what he calls Reconnaissance Strike Groups, the U.S. wins. And that’s the crux of Macgregor’s argument: Today the U.S. Army is comprised of BCTs rather than Reconnaissance Strike Groups, or RSGs, which is Macgregor’s innovation. Macgregor’s RSG shears away what he describes as “the top-heavy Army command structure” that would come with any deployment in favor of units that generate more combat power. “Every time we deploy a division we deploy a division headquarters of 1,000 soldiers and officers,” Macgregor explains. “What a waste; those guys will be dead within 72 hours.” Macgregor’s RSG, what he calls “an alternative force design,” does away with this Army command echelon, reporting to a joint force commander–who might or might not be an Army officer. An RSG, Macgregor says, does not need the long supply tail that is required of Brigade Combat Teams – it can be sustained with what it carries from ten days to two weeks without having to be resupplied.
Macgregor’s views line him up against Lt. General H.R. McMaster, an officer widely thought of as one of the Army’s best thinkers. McMaster fought under Macgregor at “73 Easting,” where he commanded Eagle Troop in Macgregor’s Cougar Squadron. McMaster, however, had more success in the Army than Macgregor, is a celebrated author (of Dereliction of Duty, a classic in military history), and is credited with seeding the Anbar Awakening during the Iraq War. Even so, McMaster was twice passed over for higher command until David Petraeus, who headed his promotion board, insisted his success be recognized. McMaster is now a lieutenant general and commands the high-profile Army Capabilities Integration Center (called “ARCINC”), whose mandate is to “design the Army of the future.”
For McMaster, the question isn’t simply whether the U.S. (and the Army) can fight and win (he believes it can); it’s whether having won it’s possible to manage the victory; in Colin Powell’s phrase, to “own the china” once it’s been broken. Macgregor says his RSGs are self- contained and can fight and win without resupply for seven days to two weeks. McMaster scoffs at this, saying it might take a lot longer and the Army is not simply asked to deploy, fight and win, but to then manage the post-conflict environment and “prepare for every contingency.” And that, in turn, takes a lot more troops. Macgregor’s response? If you focus on fighting and winning instead of nation building you won’t need 630,000 troops.
This is precisely the problem that has dogged the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq, where insufficient forces were required to endure multiple deployments. More simply, the U.S. military proved it could defeat Saddam’s vastly superior numbers with just 148,000 U.S. troops – but running the country after Saddam’s defeat strained American resources, led to multiple unit deployments and resulted in the adoption of a last-gasp surge.
An Army that cannot be sustained dampens recruiting, erodes readiness, undermines officer retention and increases desertions. Put another way, McMaster implies, an Army of 420,000 (a number that slashing the Army budget will yield), can fight and win a war–but, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, it’s not enough to maintain the peace.
“People think of the Army as simply a combat force, but if Afghanistan and Iraq have shown anything it’s that after you have conquered the space you still have to manage it,” McMaster argues. “I want to make it clear here: we will operate within the budget. The Army has always made do with what the Congress believes is appropriate–and we’ll do that now. But the American people must understand that we are being asked to shape political outcomes, and that requires resources. It’s not just a matter of building combat capable units, you have to supplement those units and train those units to provide governance.
Macgregor responds by pointing out that ultimate victory is not a matter of size. “The problem with the U.S. Army is much bigger than numbers,” he says. “It’s not organized, equipped, or trained for a high end, conventional, integrated joint battle with a numerically and at least in some ways qualitatively superior enemy on the enemy’s chosen turf. In the simulation, it’s Russia. But it could just as easily be China. Even if you increased the Army to 600,000 in its current form … it would still fail. That’s the problem and, by the way, the Army knows it.”
McMaster disagrees. “We’ve built an Army that knows how to fight and win,” he says, “and it’s proven that. Can we get better? Sure, we can get better. And we’re working to get better every day. But our military has been successful in protecting this country, in deterring aggression. But for deterrence to be effective you need a brute force option. That’s what the Army is – our brute force option. It’s a pretty good one.”
Still, at the end of the day, whether the US Army decides to go back to the old division organizational structure, keep the current BCT’s or implement the RSG’s, the problems remain the same. Much of the focus in the Army needs to return to its bread and butter, fire and maneuver with tanks and Bradleys, backed up by heavy artillery and tactical air support. The Army needs to train its armored force for the kind of combat it will face in the next decade, not relive the battles of Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the Army needs more soldiers and organic units. It all takes money. Without enough funding, the problems facing the Army will not only continue, but worsen.
In its current state, if the US Army is called upon to fight the Russians or the Iranians or Chinese, the results could be disastrous.

Some Legacy

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LOGIC?

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Antarctica

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Imagine if you will

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Gun Deaths

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The First

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Taking out the garbage!

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Teddy Bear

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Thin Skin

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Whiners!

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