Tea Party Tribune 
^ | 2012-06-29 12:11:00 | danmillerinpanama 
The majority decision distorts the Constitution to uphold 
ObamaCare.
As bad as ObamaCare is, the decision transcends ObamaCare most 
perniciously because it expands the power of the 
Congress to interfere in countless other ways as yet 
unknown in how we live our lives.
John 
Turley today noted that having decided that the ObamaCare individual mandate 
is outside the authority of the Congress under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme 
Court found the requisite authority in the congressional authority to tax.
But no sooner had Roberts proclaimed his love for federalism than he 
effectively killed it. Roberts held that the individual mandate still fell 
squarely within the taxing authority of Congress. If so, all those "broccoli" 
questions asked by Roberts and other justices simply move over to the tax side. 
If Congress can "tax" people for not having health insurance, how about taxes on 
people who don't have cellphones (as Roberts asked)? Just as there was no clear 
limiting principle in the commerce clause debate, there is a lack of such a 
principle in the tax debate. Instead, Roberts simply says the individual mandate 
is supported by a "functional approach" that has long allowed federal taxes to 
"seek to influence conduct" by citizens.
. . . .
It is hard to see who will be the ultimate winner from this decision. But the 
biggest loser is federalism. Roberts lifted it up only to make it an exquisite 
corpse. In that sense, the decision reads like the funeral speech of another 
character in Julius Caesar. To paraphrase Mark Anthony, Roberts came to bury 
federalism, not to praise it.
I agree; however it may be worse than that.
These excerpts from Chief Justice Roberts' 
majority 
decision attempt to explain that congressional language to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the individual mandate is a tax.
Beginning in 2014, those who do not comply with the mandate must make a 
"[s]hared responsibility payment" to the Federal Government. §5000A(b)(1). That 
payment, which the Act describes as a "penalty," is calculated as a percentage 
of household income, subject to a floor based on a specified dollar amount and a 
ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual would have to pay for 
qualifying private health insurance.
The Act provides that the penalty will be paid to the Internal Revenue 
Service with an individual's taxes, and "shall be assessed and collected in the 
same manner" as tax penalties, such as the penalty for claiming too large an 
income tax refund.

You did not buy what we told you to.
The decision then tries to explain why the individual mandate, although 
labeled a "penalty," may be deemed a "tax" because that seems to have been what 
the Congress desired. The attempted explanation is a tortured one and makes very 
little sense. However, the precedent has been established. In consequence, the 
Congress now has wide discretion to regulate almost anything it wishes under its 
taxing powers. That is illustrated by this portion of the decision:
In making its Commerce Clause argument, the Government defended the mandate 
as a regulation requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. The 
Government does not claim that the taxing power allows Congress to issue such a 
command. Instead, the Government asks us to read the mandate not as ordering 
individuals to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on those who do not 
buy that product.
. . . .
Under the mandate, if an individual does not maintain health insurance, the 
only consequence is that he must make an additional payment to the IRS when he 
pays his taxes. See §5000A(b). That, according to the Government, means the 
mandate can be regarded as establishing a condition-not owning health 
insurance-that triggers a tax-the required payment to the IRS. Under that 
theory, the mandate is not a legal command to buy insurance. Rather, it 
makes going without insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like 
buying gasoline or earning income. And if the mandate is in effect just a 
tax hike on certain taxpayers who do not have health insurance, it may be within 
Congress's constitutional power to tax. (Emphasis added.)
The thesis appears to be that just as the Congress can tax the 
purchase of gasoline, so can it tax the 
non-purchase of 
gasoline and 
therefore the non-purchase of insurance. That 
does not follow; the Congress has 
not taxed the 
non-purchase 
of gasoline. Nor does the thesis appear to be supported by the other examples 
cited in the decision -- taxes on the 
purchase of imported goods to 
promote the sale of domestic goods, taxes on the 
purchase of marijuana 
and tobacco to discourage their use, etc. The Congress has not taxed 
(previously) the 
non-purchase of domestic goods or, for that matter, 
services.
The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the 
mandate, but only whether it is a "fairly possible" one . . . . The Government 
asks us to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise 
violate the Constitution. Granting the Act the full measure of deference owed to 
federal statutes, it can be so read, for the reasons set forth 
below.
Were I writing a law review article it would be appropriate, as an 
intellectual exercise, to dissect and criticize the Court's reasoning by 
citations to prior authority and scholarly commentary. It might also be useful 
to consider whether the Court's decision will spur to greater activity the Law 
of Unintended Consequences or whether the effects were actually intended and 
thought good. However here, for more practical purposes, that is not relevant 
because the Supreme Court has spoken and what it said will likely remain "the 
law of the land" until some later Supreme Court changes it.
Continuing from the majority opinion,
If it is troubling to interpret the Commerce Clause as authorizing Congress 
to regulate those who abstain from commerce, perhaps it should be similarly 
troubling to permit Congress to impose a tax for not doing 
something.
The Court then attempts to explain why it does not see that as a problem.
Congress's use of the Taxing Clause to encourage buying something is . . . 
not new. Tax incentives already promote,for example, purchasing homes and 
professional educations. See 26 U. S. C. §§163(h), 25A. Sustaining the mandate 
as a tax depends only on whether Congress has properly exercised its taxing 
power to encourage purchasing health insurance, not whether it can. Upholding 
the individual mandate under the Taxing Clause thus does not recognize any new 
federal power. It determines that Congress has used an existing 
one.
There are various ways to "encourage" people to do or to refrain from doing 
things. It has long been considered constitutional to provide tax credits and 
deductions for purchases deemed desirable. It would be consistent with the 
Constitution to provide annual tax deductions and credits to people who purchase 
approved health insurance policies, even in amounts substantially greater than 
the annual costs of such policies. Whether doing so would be bad policy is not 
for the Court to determine. However, the imposition of 
additional taxes 
on those who do 
not make such purchases is a novelty. Still, according 
to the Court, that does not much matter because only money is involved.
[A]lthough the breadth of Congress's power to tax is greater than its power 
to regulate commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of 
control over individual behavior. Once we recognize that Congress may regulate a 
particular decision under the Commerce Clause, the Federal Government can bring 
its full weight to bear. Congress may simply command individuals to do as it 
directs. An individual who disobeys may be subjected to criminal sanctions. 
Those sanctions can include not only fines and imprisonment, but all the 
attendant consequences of being branded a criminal: deprivation of otherwise 
protected civil rights, such as the right to bear arms or vote in elections; 
loss of employment opportunities; social stigma; and severe disabilities in 
other controversies, such as custody or immigration disputes.
By contrast, Congress's authority under the taxing power is limited to 
requiring an individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no more. If 
a tax is properly paid, the Government has no power to compel or punish 
individuals subject to it. We do not make light of the severe burden that 
taxation-especially taxation motivated by a regulatory purpose-can impose. But 
imposition of a tax nonetheless leaves an individual with a lawful choice to do 
or not do a certain act, so long as he is willing to pay a tax levied on 
that choice.
The Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individuals pay a 
financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be 
characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not 
our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness. (Emphasis 
added.)
The authority to tax -- the power to destroy -- gives the Congress tremendous 
power to do stupid as well as wise things. Let's consider a not very farfetched 
example. Suppose the Congress were to increase the income tax rate by fifty 
percent for all eligible citizens who fail to vote in a specified Federal 
election; voting is good and should therefore be encouraged. Perhaps fifty 
percent is too much; how about ten percent? As to ObamaCare, the Court said, "we 
need not here decide the precise point at which an exaction becomes so punitive 
that the taxing power does not authorize it." It would, therefore, be up to the 
Congress to decide how high is too high and (only maybe) for the Court later to 
second guess it. That provides slim comfort at best. The Congress could probably 
accomplish much the same thing by decreasing the tax rate, providing tax credits 
or tax deductions in whatever amount it might wish for those who 
do 
vote, so why should it be unable to increase as much as it might wish the taxes 
of those who 
don't vote? Based on the Court's decision, a distinction 
is far from obvious.
This post merely scratches the surface of what the Congress can now do 
via its taxing powers to 
force encourage people to do 
whatever 
it, in its infinite wisdom, considers good -- be it good for 
CongressCriters themselves, for previously deprived U.S. citizens or residents, 
for the country, for the global environment or for peace on Earth and good will 
to men.
The power to tax far transcends the power to regulate commerce under the 
Commerce Clause. The related problems transcend President Obama, the Congress 
and even ObamaCare itself. Although repealing ObamaCare, defeating President 
Obama and electing conservatives to the Congress will make many of us happy, 
that will neither expunge the precedent created by the Court majority nor ensure 
that no future Congress will do something similar in the health care or any 
other context. It will not matter (nor should it, based on years of 
jurisprudence) whether the enactment is bad policy or just plain stupid. As the 
Chief Justice noted near the beginning the decision,
We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies. That judgment is 
entrusted to the Nation's elected leaders. We ask only whether Congress has the 
power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions.
. . . .
"Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government" requires that we 
strike down an Act of Congress only if "the lack of constitutional authority to 
pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated." United States v. Harris, 
106 U. S. 629, 635 (1883). Members of this Court are vested with the authority 
to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to 
make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation's elected 
leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. It is 
not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political 
choices.
That is all true and correct. The Supreme Court does not guard us against 
absurd congressional policy decisions. As to actions, wise or stupid, that 
contravene the Constitution we can rely on the Constitution alone, as 
interpreted by the Court (or perhaps on the veto power of the President) to 
prevent them. True, we can try to elect to the Congress and to the presidency 
only people who can be trusted to make wise and fair decisions; how's that been 
working out? True also, we can also watch how our CongressCritters and President 
vote and refuse to reelect those with whose decisions we disagree; how's that 
been working out?
Perhaps a constitutional amendment forbidding the Federal taxation of 
failures to purchase goods and services would help. Under 
Article 
V, an amendment can be proposed by the Congress upon the vote of two thirds 
of its members or the Congress, "on the Application of the Legislatures of two 
thirds of the several States, [the Congress] shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments." An amendment proposed by the Congress or by the 
convention becomes effective as part of the Constitution
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or 
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of 
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
The Constitution was intentionally made very difficult to amend, and that is 
a good thing. Unfortunately, good and reasonable amendments are no less 
difficult to achieve than are bad and frivolous amendments.
The only hopeful aspect of the ObamaCare decision is that it 
may 
encourage greater wisdom in electing 
our CongressCritters and 
Presidents. I hate to end on a sour note, but how likely does that seem?
First published at 
Dan 
Miller's Blog.
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